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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-WHERE NEW PROS-
ECUTION IS INITIATED FOR ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NOT
SPECIFIED IN AN ORIGINAL INDICTMENT, ACTUAL VINDICTIVENESS IS
THE PROPER STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH PROSECUTO-
RIAL CONDUCT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE.
United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1979)
On November 16, 1975, Tallice Andrews, Thurston Brooks, and Fannie
Braswell were stopped and arrested for alleged narcotics and firearms of-
fenses. 1 A two-count indictment was returned on November 8, 1976,2
charging the three defendants with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, 3 and with unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commission of
a felony. 4 On December 29, 1976, defendants Andrews and Brooks ap-
peared before a United States magistrate to be arraigned and, pursuant to
the government's request, were remanded without bail.5 These defendants
successfully appealed the magistrate's ruling and both were admitted to bail
on January 11, 1977.6 Two days later, a grand jury returned a superseding
indictment charging all three individuals with offenses identical to the
November, 1976 indictment except that a conspiracy count was added. 7 De-
1. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 1-2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) rehear-
ing granted en banc, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 1980). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had upheld the validity of that stop in a prior decision. United States v.
Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1979).
2. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). A com-
plaint had been issued against all the defendants two days after the arrest but was dismissed in
January, 1976, for lack of progress. United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), rev'd and remanded, United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14,
1979). Subsequently, in August 1976, Fannie Braswell was indicted for violations of the narcot-
ics laws. 444 F. Supp. at 1239. That indictment was superseded by the new charges brought on
November 8, 1976, in which all three individuals were jointly indicted. Id. See text accompany-
ing note 7 infra.
3. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). See 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). This section provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... Id.
4. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). See
U.S.C. § 924(b) (Supp. 1977). Section 924(b) states:
Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that an
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is to be committed
therewith, ships, transports, or receives a firearm or any ammunition in interstate or
foreign commerce shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
Id.
5. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The
reasons underlying the government's request that no bail be set were that "Fannie BrasWell had
turned state's evidence, had been threatened, and had been placed in the federal witness pro-
tection program." Id. slip op. at 2 n.2.
6. Id. slip op. at 2.
7. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Section 846 states that "[a]ny person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or
fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the
(365)
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fendants Andrews and Brooks then filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the
added charge, contending that it was obtained in retaliation for their exercise
of the constitutional and statutory right 8 to reasonable bail, and was, there-
fore, the product of unconstitutional prosecutorial conduct. 9 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the conspiracy count. 10
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that when additional charges are brought
against a defendant subsequent to his assertion of some procedural right,
such prosecutorial conduct violates due process" only if the defendant can
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id. The substantive offense
involved in the indictment for conspiracy was found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v.
Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). For the text of § 8 41(a)(1), see
note 3 supra.
8. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The
eighth amendment proscribes the imposition of"[e]xcessive bail." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. As
a corollary to this constitutional right, Congress has set forth the conditions upon which a judi-
cial officer may impose bail in order to reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant for trial,
as well as the factors that should influence the exercise of that discretion. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a), (b) (1976). Furthermore, rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
requires that "eligibility for release prior to trial shall be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3146."
FED. R. CrIM. P. 46(a).
9. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The
thrust of the defendant's claim was that the additional charge should be stricken because it was
the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). United States v.
Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Under the rule of Pearce and
Blackledge, due process of law is violated when the prosecutorial decision to procure a supersed-
ing indictment is motivated, or appears to be motivated, by a desire to punish a defendant for
exercising his legal rights. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 28; North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. at 725. For a detailed discussion of these two cases and the concept of prosecutorial
vindictiveness, see notes 12-21 & 27-34 and accompanying text infra.
10. United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1978) rev'd and re-
manded, United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Although the gov-
ernment was aware of all the facts necessary to obtain the conspiracy charge at the time of the
November, 1976 indictment, it sought to justify the new charge as a combined result of the
prosecutor's inexperience, a moratorium on the work of the grand jury, and vacation scheduling
difficulties in the prosecutor's office. Id. at 1241. The government argued that but for these
circumstances, it "would have presented the conspiracy evidence to the Grand Jury in mid-
December prior to the time defendants filed their bond motion." Id. (footnote omitted). The
district court determined that the prosecutor's failure to add the conspiracy count prior to the
defendant's assertion of the right to bail was not malicious. Id. at 1243. Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court reasoned that even the mere appearance of retaliatory vindictiveness violates due
process of law since the apprehension of such conduct may deter a defendant from exercising
his constitutional or statutory rights. Id. at 1240, citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The district court indicated that only two excep-
tions can prevent the application of this prophylactic rule by dispelling the appearance of vindic-
tiveness: 1) where the essential elements of the increased offense did not exist at the time of the
original indictment; and 2) where the government discovers new evidence of which it was ex-
cusably unaware at the time of the original charge. Id. at 1241. Since neither of these cir-
cumstances was present in the instant case, the district court concluded that the increase in
charges did not satisfy the demands of the due process clause "in preserving unblemished the
integrity of our criminal justice system." Id. at 1244.
11. The due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
[VOL. 25: p. 365
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prove actual vindictiveness in the bringing of the added charges. 12 United
States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979), rehearing granted
en banc, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 1980).13
The United States Supreme Court first examined the due process limi-
tations on governmental retaliation for a defendant's exercise of his legal
rights in North Carolina v. Pearce. 14 In Pearce, defendant was convicted in
a North Carolina court for assault with intent to commit rape, and was sen-
tenced by the trial judge to a twelve to fifteen year prison term. 15 The
defendant subsequently initiated a state post-conviction appeal which re-
sulted in a reversal of his conviction. 16 After being convicted again upon
retrial, he was sentenced by the same judge to a harsher term than had
originally been imposed. 17 In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme
Court observed that it was repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness to
penalize those who choose to exercise protected rights. 18 Thus, the Court
held:
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the fourteenth amendment states, "nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
12. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). This
holding comprises only part of Judge Green's elaborately articulated standard for determining
when prosecutorial conduct is unconstitutionally vindictive. Id. Judge Green distinguished the
situation in which the prosecution adds new charges arising out of "criminal conduct relatively
distinct from that underlying the original charge" from the situation where the prosecution adds
new charges "for a different and distinct offense which was a different and distinct consequence
of the same basic conduct underlying the original charge." Id. Although in both instances the
defendant must show actual vindictiveness, Judge Green concluded that in the first situation the
prosecutor could rebut the defendant's case by offering a plausible explanation for his conduct,
whereas, in the second, he must offer facts which reasonably negate any inference of vindictive
intent. Id. slip op. at 17-18. Judge Green also held that when the prosecution substitutes
charges, thereby increasing the potential severity of the punishment to which the defendant is
exposed, a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness is created which can be overcome
only by a showing that intervening circumstances created a fact situation which did not exist at
the time of the original indictment. Id. slip op. at 17. For a discussion of Judge Green's de-
velopment of this tripartite standard against which prosecutorial conduct is to be measured, see
notes 57-71 and accompanying text infra.
13. For a discussion of the precedential value of the decision in Andrews, see note 55 infra.
14. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In a companion case to Pearce, Simpson v. Rice, the defendant
pleaded guilty to four separate counts of second-degree burglary and was sentenced to serve a
10-year prison term. Id. at 714. After successfully attacking this conviction on the basis that he
had been denied his constitutional right to counsel, the defendant was retried and convicted for
three of the original counts, but received a 25-year sentence. Id.
15. Id. at 713.
16. Id.
17. Id. Although the second sentence was only an eight-year prison term, the parties stipu-
lated that it amounted to a greater sentence when considered with the time Pearce had already
served for his original sentence. Id.
18. Id. at 724, citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). The Pearce Court
noted that the Supreme Court "has never held that the States are required to establish avenues
of appellate review." 395 U.S. at 724, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 484 U.S. 305 (1966). The
Court also stated, however, that it is patently unconstitutional to "put a price on appeal" or to
"impede open and equal access" once these avenues have been established. Id., quoting Wor-
chester v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 370 F.2d 713, 714 (1st Cir. 1966) and Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966).
1979-1980]
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Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a de-
fendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must
play no part in the sentences he receives after a new trial. And
since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a
defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also retlitres that a defendant be freed
of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the
sentencing judge. 19
As a prophylaxis against vindictiveness in the resentencing process, the
Court required that, upon a showing by the defendant of the imposition of a
harsher sentence, the government must show articulable reasons for any in-
crease in punishment. 920 The Court specifically stated that "[those reasons
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on
the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentenc-
ing." 21
The Supreme Court subsequently determined that not "all possibilities
of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal" violate due process. 22 For
example, in Colten v. Kentucky, 23 the Court held that an increased penalty
imposed by a different judge after a trial de novo is not unconstitutional
since such a two-tiered trial arrangement does not feature the same potential
for judicial vindictiveness as was present in Pearce.24  Similarly, in Chaffin
The defendant in Pearce also advanced the argument that imposition of a harsher sentence
upon retrial is proscribed by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 395 U.S. at
719. In rejecting this claim, the Court conceded that the constitutional guarantees against dou-
ble jeopardy essentially protect against: 1) a second prosecution for the same offense after ac-
quittal; 2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; or 3) multiple punishments
for the same offense. Id. at 717 & no. 8-11, 721. Nonetheless, Justice Stewart's majority opinion
regarded as applicable the exception that the double jeopardy clause "imposes no limitations
whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who had succeeded in getting his first conviction
set aside." Id. at 720 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
19. 395 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court further explained the
nexus between the first part of this standard (actual vindictiveness) and the second part (ap-
prehension of vindictiveness) as follows: "[T]he very threat inherent in the existence of such a
punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights.' " Id. at 724, quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
It is important to note that the standard emmnciated in Pearce applies whether the first convic-
tion is overturned fbr constitutional or nonconstitutional error. 395 U.S. at 724. In Pearce, the
defendant's first conviction was set aside on the ground that an involmntary confession had been
unconstititionally admitted into evidence. Id. at 713. See State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 237,
145 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1966). The companion case to Pearce, Simpson c. Rice, was also reversed
on the basis of constitutional rights. 395 U.S. at 714. See note 14 supra. The Court expressly
held, however, that its due process standard against judicial vindictiveness could be asserted
when a defendant pursued "a statutory right of appeal or collateral reiedy." 395 U.S. at 724.
20, 395 U.S. at 726.
21, Id. The Court also mandated that such factual information be made part of the record,
in order that the justification for any increased sentence may be carefully examined on appeal.
id.
22. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972): notes 23-26 and accompanying text infra. For
a discussion of Blackledge, see notes 27-34 and accompanying text infra.
23. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
24. Id. at 116. In Colten, the defendant was convicted in an inferior state court for disor-
derly conduct and was fined $10. Id. at 108. Dissatisfied with the outcome, he exercised his
[VOL. 25: p. 365
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v. Stynchcombe, 25 the Supreme Court reasoned that under the cir-
cumstances of the case due process does not bar the imposition of a higher
sentence by a different jury on retrial following reversal of a prior convic-
tion. 26
The development of the concept of vindictiveness in judicial sentencing
prompted inquiry into the possibility of similar impropriety in the exercise of
a prosecutor's charging authority. The Supreme Court in Blackledge v.
Perry2 7 interpreted the due process clause as extending protection to an
accused against prosecutorial vindictiveness. 28 In Blackledge, a North
statutory right to a trial de novo under Kentucky's two-tiered system for adjudicating certain
criminal cases. Id. The new trial in a court of general criminal jurisdiction resulted in Colten's
reconviction and an enhanced fine of $50. Id. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
Colten argued that Kentucky's two-tiered trial de novo system was substantially comparable to
the appellate remedy pursued in Pearce in that both "involve reconviction and resentencing,
[and] provide the convicted defendant with the right to 'appeal.' " Id. at 115. Relying upon the
fact that no evidence was shown which indicated why a de novo court would treat vindictively
those who request a trial before it, the Supreme Court concluded that a trial de novo represents
a "completely fresh determination" by a different cQurt. Id. at 116-17.
25. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
26. Id. at 26. The petitioner in Chaffin was convicted on a charge of robbing by open force
or violence and was sentenced by the jury to serve a 15-year prison term. Id. at 18. After
obtaining a reversal of his conviction on the basis that an erroneous jury instruction was given
by the trial judge, the petitioner was retried before a different judge and a new jury for the
same offense. Id. at 19. After finding him guilty for a second time, the jury returned a life
sentence. Id. Thereafter, the petitioner filed for habeas corpus relief, arguing that due process
of law required that Pearce be extended to jury sentencing. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court
observed that "the jury was not aware of the length of the sentence meted out by the former
jury" nor was it "told that petitioner had been convicted and that his conviction had been
overturned on collateral attack." Id. (footnote omitted). Under these circumstances, the Court
concluded that Pearce was not controlling because there is no potential for abuse by a resen-
tencing jury. Id. at 26, 28.
27. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
28. Id. at 28-29. Restraints on a prosecutor's charging power are a matter of special concern
because the interface between prosecutorial vindictiveness and prosecutorial discretion is deli-
cately drawn. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21-22 (6th Cir. Dec. 14,
1979) (Merritt, J., concurring). It is when a prosecutor's freedom to decide unilaterally whether
to prosecute a suspect becomes contaminated with an element of punishment that legitimate
discretionary power turns into impermissibly vindictive conduct. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 362-65 (1978).
One commentator has stated that there are two elements which generally influence a pros-
ecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute: "practical factors" and "considerations specifically
linked to particular offense categories." Abrams, Internal Policy: Griding the Exercise of Pros-
ecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 11 (1971). The practical factors include: "the
prosecutor's belief in the guilt of a suspect, the likelihood of a conviction, the possibility of
obtaining the suspect's cooperation in other matters, the prosecutor's concern about his record
for obtaining convictions, the influence of the law enforcement agents involved, and the general
character of the offender." Id., citing F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 174 (1965). The considerations linked to particular offense categories which might
influence prosecutorial discretion are: the community's opinion of a statute, the constitutional
legitimacy of applying it to certain conduct, and the availability of alternative means of enforce-
ment. Id. at 11, 15, 16.
Courts have generally refrained from interfering with the exercise of a prosecutor's charging
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1975); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Sweepston v. United
1979-1980]
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Carolina prison inmate was charged and convicted for the misdemeanor of
assault with a deadly weapon. 29 After the defendant filed an appeal for a
trial de novo, the prosecutor obtained a superseding indictment charging
him with felonious assault with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily
harm. 30 In a habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant argued that the
felony indictment was invalid under Pearce.31 Recognizing that the pros-
ecution has a significant stake in deterring criminal defendants from appeal-
ing their convictions, and that it "has the means readily at hand to discour-
age such appeals by 'upping the ante,' " the Supreme Court found that the
exercise of a prosecutor's charging authority poses a realistic opportunity for
vindictiveness. 32 The Court therefore concluded that due process of law
requires application of the restrictions first articulated in Pearce to pros-
ecutorial decisions. 33 Although it found no evidence of actual vindictive-
States, 289 F.2d 166, 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1961); United States v. Bryson,
434 F. Supp. 986, 988 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 838 (1963). Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved of such
deference to the prosecutor's powers:
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.
Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable
offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a fed-
eral constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962) (footnote omitted). Underlying this unwillingness to interfere with the free exercise of a
prosecutor's decision to bring charges is the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). But see K. DAvis,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 209-11 (1969) (reluctance to interfere is less a function of reason, than
settled judicial tradition); Noll, Controlling a Prosecutor's Screening Discretion Through Fuller
Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697, 730-37 (1978) (indirectly, courts do, in fact, "review" a
prosecutor's decision to prosecute by such judicial procedures as judgments n.o.v. and probable
cause hearings).
29. 417 U.S. at 23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(b)(1) (1969).
30. 417 U.S. at 23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (1969). The defendant pleaded guilty to
the second indictment and was sentenced to serve a five to seven year prison term. 417 U.S. at
23.
31. 417 U.S. at 24. The defendant also claimed that the reindictment on the felony charge
constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. The Court, however, found it unneces-
sary to address this contention since the defendant's due process attack under Pearce was dis-
positive. Id. at 25. For a discussion of the double jeopardy clause, see note 18 supra.
32. 417 U.S. at 27-28. The Supreme Court maintained that prosecutors have a twofold in-
terest in discouraging appeals because 1) any appeal would require increased expenditures of
limited prosecutorial resources; and 2) a formerly convicted defendant may be allowed to go free
on appeal. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 28-29. To prevent vindictiveness in the resentencing process, Pearce set forth a
two-pronged test: 1) there must be no actual vindictiveness; and 2) the defendant must be free
of apprehension of any vindictiveness. See 395 U.S. at 725; note 19 and accompanying text
supra. See also Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 249 (5th Cir. 1977). Therefore, in describ-
ing Blackledge's holding, courts have stated that both actual vindictiveness and the apprehen-
sion of vindictiveness is the proper standard against which prosecutorial conduct is to be mea-
sured in determining whether it is unconstitutionally vindictive. For example, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated in accordance with Blackledge, that "[tihe harm which the constitution prohibits is
both the likelihood of vindictiveness and the apprehension of retaliation by either judge or
[VOL. 25: p. 365
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ness, the Blackledge Court held that the prosecutor's conduct was uncon-
stitutional since Pearce's requirement that a defendant must be freed of any
apprehension of vindictiveness remained unsatisfied. 34
Lower courts have liberally applied Blackledge's rule against prosecuto-
rial vindictiveness to encompass circumstances not envisioned in that case.
In United States v. Jamison,35 for instance, the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that Blackledge was not restricted to the situation where a super-
seding indictment is obtained after a defendant pursues his post-conviction
appellate remedies.36 Rather, the court held that Blackledge also required
"restrictions on increased charges after mistrials."37  In United States v.
prosecutor which may deter a defendant from appealing his conviction because his punishment
may be enlarged on retrial." United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis added), citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974). Cf. United States v.
DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977) (Pearce with its dual requirements, was the
progenitor of Blackledge).
34. 417 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court thus determined that a defendant's mere showing of
an apprehension of vindictiveness, without proof of actual vindictiveness, is sufficient to violate
due process of law. Id. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978). The
Blackledge Court stated:
The rationale of our judgment in the Pearce case . . . was not grounded upon the proposi-
tion that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasized that
"since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise
of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires
that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation ......
417 U.S. at 28, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725. The Blackledge Court
indicated, however, that there were countervailing circumstances which the state might have
shown to negate the defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness. Id. at 29 n.7. The Court
thought that if it was impossible to proceed on a more serious charge at the time of the original
indictment (as where an assault victim subsequently dies), then there would be sufficient justifi-
cation to sustain the prosecution's second charge. Id., citing Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S.
442 (1912). Cf. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (intervening
events or new evidence of which the prosecution was excusably unaware at the time of the
original indictment might also justify an increase in charges). The Blackledge Court's exception
is analogous to the one adopted in Pearce, where the Supreme Court held that there could be
no finding of judicial vindictiveness if the sentencing judge could show sufficient justification for
imposing a heavier sentence. 395 U.S. at 726. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
It is interesting to note that the first application of Pearce-type restrictions to prosecutorial
vindictiveness occurred just three weeks after the Pearce Court's decision. See Sefcheck v.
Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969). As in Blackledge, the defendant in Sefcheck was
reprosecuted on a harsher charge for the same conduct after he successfully appealed his first
conviction. Id. at 794. The district court stated that the Pearce principle applies equally to all
state officials because fear that a prosecutor might vindictively increase a charge would uncon-
stitutionally deter the exercise of a defendant's rights as "effectively as fear of a vindictive in-
crease in sentence by [a] court." Id. at 795.
35. 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jamison, the defendants were indicted for second
degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon. Id. at 409. At their first trial, they moved
for a mistrial on grounds of "ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. The trial judge declared a
mistrial and the defendants were subsequently reindicted forfirst degree murder and for carry-
ing a dangerous weapon. Id. At the second trial, the defendants were convicted on these in-
creased charges. Id. at 410. Thereafter, the defendants appealed the validity of the second
indictment, charging that Blackledge's due process rule against fear of vindictiveness prohibits a
charge increase following a successful defense request for a mistrial. Id.
36. Id. at 415.
37. Id. at 416. The court perceived no persuasive distinction "between attacks which defen-
dants make on the fairness of criminal proceedings before and after they are complete." Id.
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DeMarco,3 8 the Ninth Circuit determined that even in a pretrial situation, if
charges are added following a defendant's motion for change of venue, due
process "is controlled by the teaching of Blackledge."' 9
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,4 0 however, the Supreme Court excluded
from the scope of Blackledge prosecutorial conduct occurring during the
course of plea negotiations. 41 In Bordenkircher, a defendant with two prior
felony convictions was indicted on a felony charge for issuing a forged in-
strument. 42 During plea negotiations, the prosecutor threatened that he
would obtain a recidivist indictment with a mandatory sentence of life im-
prisonment if the defendant did not plead guilty. 4 3 After the defendant
rejected the prosecution's plea offer, he was reindicted on the more serious
charge. 44 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling "that
the prosecutor's conduct during the bargaining negotiations had violated the
principles of Blackledge v. Perry."45  The Bordenkircher Court's decision
Furthermore, the court stated that the administration of our criminal justice system would be
seriously hampered if it permitted subsequent indictments after mistrials, but not after rever-
sals, reasoning that such a distinction "would discourage defendants from seeking mistrials when
error prejudicial to them has occurred, whereas mistrials in such cases may represent a signifi-
cant saving of judicial resources." Id.
38. 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 1227. The prosecution in DeMarco appealed the district court's dismissal of an
indictment charging two individuals with making false statements to an IRS agent in California.
Id. at 1225 n.1, citing United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975). This
indictment was procured after the defendants, who had previously been indicted in the District
of Columbia for making false statements to an IRS agent, insisted on changing venue to the
districts of their residence, Chicago and Los Angeles. 550 F.2d at 1226. The prosecution had
been aware of facts upon which the second indictment was based before the first indictment was
brought. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that it could perceive no substantial difference between the
defendants' statutory right to change venue and Perry's right to a trial de novo in Blackledge.
Id. at 1227. The court thus concluded that there was no basis upon which to prevent the
application of Blackledge when, as here, the situation poses a realistic likelihood of vindictive-
ness. Id.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977),
also held that the absence of a formal, pretrial motion does not prevent assertion of a
Blackledge claim. 557 F.2d at 645. There, an alien misdemeanant, who was initially charged
with unlawful entry, was subsequently indicted on a felony charge covering the same act. Id.
The second indictment was brought after the defendant's counsel indicated before a United
States magistrate that no plea would be entered because of the later possibility of raising a
suppression motion. Id. at 645-46. The court of appeals expressly stated that the failure to
interpose a formal motion would not distinguish this case from Blackledge. Id. at 645.
40. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
41. Id. at 362.
42. Id. at 358.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 359.
45. Id. at 360. The Sixth Circuit had held that "if after plea negotiations fail, [a prosecutor]
. procures an indictment charging a more serious crime, a strong inference is created that
the only reason for the more serious charges is vindictiveness." Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42,
44-45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nor. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), noted in 7
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 703 (1977). The court reasoned that prosecutorial policy is already made
when a defendant is indicted for less than all the possible offenses surrounding his criminal
spree since "a discretionary determination [has been made] that the interests of the state are
served by not seeking more serious charges." 547 F.2d at 44.
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was based upon its express determination that plea bargaining is necessary to
the administration of our criminal justice system, 46 and that such bargaining
is devoid of any "element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused
is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. "'4 7  The Court thus con-
cluded that the prosecutor's decision to indict after unsuccessful negotiations
represented "a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea bargaining
process" and not a vindictive exercise of his discretionary power to initiate
prosecution, 48
46. 434 U.S. at 361-62. The Supreme Court has dispelled any doubt as to the legitimacy of
the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1961). The
Court, however, has conditioned its approval on the requirement that a plea be voluntarily
made with an "awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The underlying assumption which makes the negotia-
tion of pleas constitutionally permissible is that properly advised defendants who are protected
by certain procedural guarantees are "unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation." Bor-
denkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
The importance of plea bargaining has been recently explained by the Supreme Court:
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while await-
ing completion of criminal proceedings.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of plea bar-
gaining as a questionable practice, see Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A. J.
621 (1976); Note, The Unconscionability of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
47. 434 U.S. at 363. The Court posited several reasons why the "give-and-take" of plea
bargaining lacks any element of punishment. Id. at 362-63. First, the prosecution and the de-
fense in plea negotiations "arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power." Id. at 362, quot-
ing Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second,
"[p]lea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors each
with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial." Id. at 363, quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970). See note 46 supra.
48. 434 U.S. at 359. It is important to note that the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher did
not foreclose the possibility of finding a Blackledge taint in the context of plea negotiations. Id. at
365. In the instant case, Hayes had been advised at the outset that if he did not accept the
prosecution's plea agreement, a harsher charge would be brought. Id. at 358. Emphasizing this
fact, the Supreme Court stated that its holding did not encompass the "situation where the
prosecutor without notice [brings] an additional charge after plea negotiations relating only to
the original indictment [have] ended with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty." Id.
at 360. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bordenkircher, see Note, 33 ARK. L. lEv. 211 (1979); Note, 24 VILL. L. REv. 142 (1978).
It is also important to note that Blackledge has been deemed inapplicable where, after a
guilty plea has been vacated on appeal, a defendant is reindicted on all charges originally
waived pursuant to a plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975). Courts have considered
this situation distinguishable from Blackledge "in terms of [the] crucial element of vindictive-
ness." Id. at 588. See also United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d at 1175. In Anderson, for exam-
ple, an information was filed against the defendant charging him with armed robbery. 514 F.2d
at 585 n. 1. After plea negotiations, the prosecution dropped the original charge in return for
Anderson's guilty plea to a lesser charge. Id. at 585 n.2. The defendant subsequently attacked
the validity of his guilty plea for its failure to comply with rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 585. See FED. R. CniM. P. 11. Following vacation of the defendant's
guilty plea by the court of appeals, the prosecution obtained a new indictment for the original
armed robbery charge. 514 F.2d at 585. The majority reasoned that when an indictment is
revived after a defendant's guilty plea is vacated, it is merely because the situation has "re-
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Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bordenkircher, lower
courts had attempted to give ample latitude to the prosecutor's discretion to
control the decision to prosecute. In Hardwick v. Doolittle, aS for example,
the defendant was indicted for armed robbery and aggravated assault. 50
After he entered a special plea of insanity and filed a petition for removal to
the federal district court, the prosecution brought additional indictments on
separate charges arising out of the same incident. 5 1  In rejecting
Blackledge's vindictiveness analysis, the Fifth Circuit observed that
Blackledge involved "the substitution of a more serious charge and not the
making of a decision to initiate prosecution for [different] criminal activ-
ity."5 2 The court reasoned that if it were to adopt Blackledge's two-pronged
test in this context, the requirement against apprehension of vindictiveness
"would render the prosecutor's discretion meaningless in every case in
which a defendant is initially indicted for less than all the violations his al-
leged spree of activity would permit." 53  The Fifth Circuit therefore held
verted to the pre-plea stage," and the prosecution is returning to its pre-plea bargaining posi-
tion. Id. at 588. The court thus held that the mere reinstitution of all original charges tinder
these circumstances is not within Blackledge's teachings since there is "no appearance of retalia-
tion when a defendant is placed in the same position as he was in before he accepted the plea
bargain." Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S, 924 (1976) (court reversed defendant's conviction which was obtained pursuant
to plea agreement, and where defendant on retrial rejected identical plea offer, reindictment
and conviction on harsher pre-plea charge was not precluded by Blackledge).
49. 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 294.
51. Id. The original armed robbery and aggravated assault counts were based upon the
defendant's theft of $43,000 from a bank in Augusta, Georgia, and a subsequent chase and
gunfight with three policemen. Id. The superseding indictment charged the defendant with two
additional counts of armed robbery and aggravated assault. Id. The added robbery count
charged the defendant with taking approximately $300 from a bank customer during the course
of the bank robbery, while "the added assault count accused him of assaulting a probation
officer whom he had bodaciously seized and used as a shield during the gun battle." Id. at 298.
52. Id. at 301. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. In determining whether pros-
ecution has been initiated for added or substituted charges, it is useful to apply the "same
evidence" test-a standard which was devised to decide if a state is in violation of the double
jeopardy clause's prohibition against punishing a defendant twice for the same offense. See, e.g.,
Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d at 297-98, 302. The formulary expression for this test was
stated by the Supreme Court in Blackburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): "Where the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
53. 558 F.2d at 302. The Fifth Circuit intimated that the right accorded to the defendant in
Blackledge to be free of any apprehension of vindictiveness would continually bar a prosecutor
from adding charges after a defendant was initially indicted. Id. Thus, the court found that
application of this aspect of Blackledge would dangerously limit a "prosecutor's broad discretion
to control the decision to prosecute." Id. at 301. In comparison, the court stated that Blackledge
involved a reindictment on substituted charges which does not bring into sharp conflict the
defendant's right to be free of apprehension and the prosecutor's charging discretion. Id. In the
Blackledge-type situation, where a prosecutor obtains an original indictment less severe than the
facts might warrant, the license a prosecutor has in deciding what charges to bring is already
exercised. Id. See also note 45 supra. The court concluded that any superseding indictment
really represents a "harsher variation of the same original decision to prosecute." 558 F.2d at
302 (emphasis added).
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that a defendant must establish actual vindictiveness on the part of the pros-
ecutor to satisfy a claim of unconstitutional conduct when a superseding in-
dictment consists of added, rather than substituted, charges. 54
54. 558 F.2d at 302. The court specifically stated that, although the defendant's mere show-
ing of added charges made out a prima facie case for finding prosecutorial vindictiveness, "the
cause should be remanded to the district court to afford the prosecutor the opportunity to come
forward with countervailing evidence." Id. The court listed some of tile explanations which
might rebut a claim of actual vindictiveness, including "mistake or oversight in the initial action,
a different approach to prosecutorial duty by a successor prosecutor, [and] public demand for
prosecution on the additional crimes allegedly committed." Id. at 301. It is important to distin-
guish these explanations from those which would be required to negate the mere apprehension
of vindictiveness. See note 34 supra. The objective explanations just listed, which will offset an
inference of actual vindictiveness, are insufficient to dispel the mere appearance of vindictive-
ness. See United States v. Andrews, 449 F. Supp. at 1241, 1244.
The following year the Fifth Circuit restated Hardwick's underlying principle that "due
process policy must be reconciled with the countervailing policy of allowing the prosecutor
broad discretion to control the decision to prosecute." Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 143
(5th Cir. 1978). Jackson, a domestic worker for the Magee family, was arrested for her participa-
tion in an unsuccessful plan to kidnap the Magees' 10-month old baby. Id. at 141. During the
course of the kidnapping, Mrs. Magee was tied up and robbed. Id. On August 21, 1973,
Jackson was indicted for aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and conspiracy to kidnap. Id.
Five months after Jackson's conviction for aggravated kidnapping was overturned, she was rein-
dicted on charges of aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary. Id.
While the Fifth Circuit noted that Jackson was factually distinguishable from Hardwick, id.
at 145, it nevertheless concluded that, as in Hardwick, only a determination of actual vindic-
tiveness would justify an interference with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion under
Blackledge. Id. at 148. The court emphasized that the test "[in deciding whether to require a
showing of actual vindictiveness or merely a showing of reasonable apprehension of vindictive-
ness" should be the same threshold balancing test utilized in Hardwick. Id. at 145. See
Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d at 301. Specifically, "the court must weigh the need to give
defendants freedom to decide whether to appeal against the need to give the prosecutors free-
dom to decide whether to prosecute." 585 F.2d at 145. Cf. Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d
1002, 1007 (1st Cir. 1979) (apprehension of vindictiveness was sufficient to establish a due pro-
cess violation since, under the circumstances of the case, a significant due process interest
outwieghed a minor prosecutorial interest). Applying its balancing test, the Jackson court held
that a "moderately weighty" prosecutorial interest prevailed against a "very limited" due process
interest. 585 F.2d at 145-48. Thus, it remanded the action to the district court to examine the
evidence in light of the actual vindictiveness standard. Id. at 148.
Under the actual vindictiveness standard, a defendant establishes a prima facie case for a
finding of vindictiveness by showing the imposition of increased charges. Id. The prosecution
may then rebut this prima facie evidence by proffering a neutral explanation to show that it did
not, in fact, act vindictively. Id. In distinction to this approach, if the balancing test required
application of an appearance of vindictiveness standard, a defendant's showing of increased
charges would be prima facie sufficient to establish a due process violation which could only be
rebutted if the prosecution demonstrates the discovery of previously unavailable evidence. Id.
at 142-43, citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
Other courts, however, have expressed different views where a superseding indictment
consists of added charges. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, dismissed a felony indictment for
possession of marijuana filed shortly after a defendant moved for discharge of a cocaine com-
plaint under the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978). In
Groves, the prosecutor argued that Blackledge should be distinguished because that case did
not involve "different crimes relating to completely separate fact situations." Id. at 454. Reject-
ing this contention, the court stated that it did not "regard the factual similarity/dissimilarity of
the two charges dispositive on the question of vindictiveness." Id. at 454. Accord, United States
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It was against this background that Judge Green55 began his analysis in
Andrews by considering the proper standard for determining the constitu-
tionality of conduct alleged to be vindictive. 56 Judge Green turned first to
the district court's holding that since the prosecutor's action in filing the
superseding indictment appeared vindictive, Blackledge required dismissal
of the conspiracy count despite the absence of any actual retaliatory motiva-
tion. 57 After examining the district judge's "overall approach," 58 Judge
Green stated that the trial court erred in finding that the concept of "ap-
pearance of vindictiveness" was the standard to be applied in the instant
case. 59 According to Judge Green, the Supreme Court's "references in Col-
ten and Chaffin to due process violations by purposeful punishment or
penalization of a defendant in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional
rights" militated against applying a rule turning on the mere appearance of
vindictiveness in this case. 60
Judge Green contended that the decision in Bordenkircher buttressed
his view that apparent vindictiveness was an inappropriate standard for gaug-
ing prosecutorial conduct in the present factual context. 61 While Judge
Green conceded that Bordenkircher was distinguishable from the case sub
55. Senior District Judge Green, sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court
in which Circuit Judge Merritt joined and filed a separate opinion. Circuit Judge Keith dis-
sented. Although Judge Merritt would severly limit the approach set forth by Judge Green, he
would not disagree that, even in the pretrial and trial process, actual vindictiveness is patently
unconstitutional whether old charges are increased or new charges added. See United States v.
Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 19 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979); text accompanying note 72 infra.
Therefore, Judge Merritt felt constrained to remand to the district court for redetermination in
accordance with Judge Green's opinion since 1) he disagreed with Judge Keith's conclusion that
the prosecutor's conduct in the instant case was unconstitutional, United States v. Andrews, No.
78-5166, slip op. at 23 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring), and 2) his double
jeopardy-type analysis did not recognize the concept of appearance of vindictiveness which un-
derlay Judge Keith's conclusion. Id. slip op. at 19 (Merritt, J., concurring) (by implication). See
id. slip op. at 34 (Keith, J., dissenting). As a result, Judge Green's opinion for the court techni-
cally embodies a majority standard for subsequent cases despite its inconsistency with Judge
Merritt's suggested view. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
56. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
57. Id. slip op. at 3-4 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979), citing United States v. Andrews, 444 F.
Supp. at 1239-40, 1244. For a discussion of the district court's opinion, see note 10 and accom-
panying text supra.
58. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
59. Id. slip op. at 5.
60. Id. slip op. at 7. Judge Green believed that the language used in those cases was not
supportive of the Pearce-Blackledge rule which protects a defendant from the mere apprehen-
sion of vindictive behavior. Id. Judge Green explained that "in Colten the Supreme Court had
spoken of due process being violated if an increased sentence was imposed 'as purposeful
punishment', while in Chaffin the concept that a jury was highly unlikely to penalize a defend-
ant for exercising a right of appeal was emphasized." Id. slip op. at 6-7 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). Judge Green concluded that, notwithstanding the deterrent effect which
a higher sentence on reconviction may have, the Supreme Court in both Colten and Chaffin
was primarily concerned with whether or not vindictiveness actually played a discernible role in
the resentencing process. Id. For a discussion of Colten and Chaffin, see notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text supra.
61. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 7 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
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judice since the "pivotal point" in the former case was that an increase in
charges as part of the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining could not be
considered vindictive,6 2 he nevertheless found that Bordenkircher's treat-
ment of Pearce and Blackledge was relevant. 63 Looking to Bordenkircher,
Judge Green observed that "in its references to and quotation from Pearce
and Blackledge the majority . . . did not refer to the broader aspects of those
earlier rulings regarding the defendant's perception of the conduct in
question-'apprehension of vindictiveness.' "64 Rather, Judge Green de-
termined that the Supreme Court alluded to the holdings in Pearce and
Blackledge as "representing the 'imposition of penalty' upon a defend-
ant. '"65 Judge Green considered Bordenkircher's interpretation of Pearce
and Blackledge to be "a clear indication to the trial courts that the doctrine
developed in those rulings is to be confined to its intended scope." 66  With
respect to the "intended scope" of the principles established in Pearce and
Blackledge, Judge Green stated that in both cases "there was a substitution
of charges-the same conduct on the part of the defendant was the basis for
the diverse sentences imposed in Pearce and underly both the misdemeanor
and felony charges in Blackledge." 67
Upon this foundation, Judge Green examined the facts of the instant
case and concluded that the same conduct was not the basis for both the
original indictment and the superseding indictment charging the conspiracy
count. 68 Judge Green noted that because the district court had failed to
observe this critical distinction between substituting charges and adding
62. Id. slip op. at 8. For a discussion of Bordenkircher, see notes 40-48 and accompanying
text supra.
63. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
64. Id. slip op. at 9. In support of this assertion, Judge Green quoted the following passage
from the Bordenkircher opinion:
This Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment "requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having success-
fully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a
new trial." The same principle was later applied [in Blackledgel to prohibit a prosecutor
from reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the defendant had
invoked an appellate remedy, since in this situation there was also a "realistic likelihood
of 'vindictiveness.' "
Id. slip op. at 8 (citations omitted), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 362.
65. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The
portion of the Bordenkircher opinion to which Judge Green was referring stated:
The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and
Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a
legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused
for lawfully attacking his conviction.
Id. slip op. at 8-9, (citations omitted), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363.
66. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 9 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. Judge Green acknowledged that the conspiracy count arose from the same total
factual pattern as did the original narcotics and firearms offenses. Id. He nevertheless believed
that the conspiracy charge was "a separate and distinct offense with elements different" from
those offenses. Id. slip op. at 9. See notes 3-4 & 7 and accompanying text supra.
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charges, it erroneously applied Blackledge's prophylactic rule.69 Relying
primarily on decisions of other circuits, 70 Judge Green held that only a
showing of actual retaliatory motivation would justify invalidating added
charges on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 71
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Merritt stated that although he
concurred "in the result and much of the reasoning of Judge Green's opin-
ion," he would limit the concept of appearance of vindictiveness to posttrial
prosecutorial conduct. 72 Judge Merritt justified this limitation on claims of
prosecutorial vindictiveness upon two grounds: 1) that the principles an-
nounced in Pearce and Blackledge were simply attempts to prevent the un-
dermining of double jeopardy values-values not implicated in this case; 73
69. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 10 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
70. See United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ricard, 563
F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Hardwick, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of Jackson, see note 54 supra.
71. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 16-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Like
the Fifth Circuit, Judge Green felt that where charges are added, the full extent of prosecutorial
discretion has not been exercised. Id. slip op. at 11. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's
approach regarding the addition of charges, see note 53 and accompanying text supra.
The following tripartite formulation constituted Judge Green's precise holding:
[lf the prosecution substitutes charges increasing the potential severity of the punishment
to which the defendant is exposed, such substitution of charges creates a prima facie case
of prosecutorial vindictiveness which can be overcome only by showing that intervening
circumstances, of which the prosecution could not reasonably have been aware created a
fact situation which did not exist at the time of the original indictment. Such a standard
places primary emphasis on the apprehension of retaliatory motivation-the perception of
the defendant.
If the prosecution adds new charges arising from criminal conduct relatively distinct
from that underlying the original charge the defendant must show actual vindictiveness in
the bringing of the added charges, although a prima facie case may be made out by the
mere fact of the added charges if no plausible explanation is offered by the prosecution.
This standard focuses on the intent of the prosecutor.
... . [T]he addition of a new charge for a different and distinct offense which was a
different and distinct consequence of the same basic conduct underlying the original
charge would make out a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, but such prima
facie case would be subject to rebuttal by the prosecution offering evidence of facts which
reasonably explain or justify the action taken and negate any inference of vindictiveness in
fact. This standard takes into recognition both the perception of the defendant and the
intent of the prosecutor, and if the trial court is not satisfied as to the plausibility or
substantiality of the government's explanation the reasonable apprehension of vindictive
motivation may be given controlling weight.
United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
72. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 19 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt,
J., concurring).
73. Id. slip op. at 19-21 (Merritt, J., concurring). Judge Merritt believed that since the
Court in Pearce and Blackledge was unwilling to decide the problem of prosecutorial retaliation
on double jeopardy grounds, it was "forced to conceptualize the problem more broadly under
the due process clause" in order to remedy the wrongs involved. Id. slip op. at 20 (Merritt, J.,
concurring). See notes 18-31 supra. Judge Merritt concluded, however, that "the two cases fit
much better the double jeopardy mold." United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21
(6th Cir. Dec.14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring).
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and 2) that the notion of prosecutorial vindictiveness is not only "inconsistent
with the competitive, adversary nature of the pre-trial and trial process,"' 74
but it is also unmanageable in this context. 75
Judge Keith dissented, criticizing Judges Green and Merritt for severely
limiting Blackledge's "needed and vital control on prosecutorial discre-
tion." 76 Insisting that his colleagues' finding that Bordenkircher limited
Blackledge was untenable, 77 Judge Keith expressly rejected their abandon-
ment of Blackledge's underlying concern with the appearance of prosecuto-
rial vindictiveness. 7 Nevertheless, Judge Keith recognized that a total bar
against added charges on reindictment could "intrude deeply into prosecuto-
rial discretion." 79  To resolve this difficulty, Judge Keith espoused "an over-
all balancing test" in which the need for prosecutorial discretion is weighed
against the interest of a defendant in being free to assert his rights without
the fear of retribution. 80
74. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21-22 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Mer-
ritt, J., concurring). Judge Merritt explained that criminal adjudication by necessity demands
the public prosecutor to assume an aggressive stance "contrary to the liberty interests of the
accused." id. slip op. at 22 (Merritt, J., concurring).
75. Id. slip op. at 21-22 (Merritt, J., concurring). To illustrate the unmanageability of the
vindictiveness concept in the pretrial and trial process, Judge Merritt asked several troublesome
questions:
Once a defendant has successfully asserted a particular legal right in the course of the
criminal process, is a prosecutor guilty of unconstitutional vindictive conduct, which
"chills" the exercise of the legal right asserted, each time the prosecutor thereafter takes a
position contrary to the interests of the defendant? If not, why not, and what is the
standard of measurement? What difference does it make that the prosecutor's conduct
took place after rather than before the defendant asserted the right?
Id. slip op. at 22 (Merritt, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied by Judge Merritt).
76. Id. slip op. at 25 (Keith, J., dissenting).
77. Id. slip op. at 36-38 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith considered Bordenkircher's
discussion of prosecutorial vindictiveness to be a product of the special factual situation present
in that case. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Bordenkircher, see notes 40-48 and
accompanying text supra. Instead of seizing upon the language of Bordenkircher to limit the
principles stated in Pearce and Blackledge, Judge Keith would restrict Bordenkircher's holding
to prosecutorial conduct during the plea bargaining process. United States v. Andrews, No.
78-5166, slip op. at 37 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting).
78. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 39 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith,
J., dissenting). According to Judge Keith, his colleagues ignored the apprehension concept de-
scribed in Pearce and Blackledge since their approach breaks down vindictiveness issues into
three factual situations: 1) substitution of charges; 2) addition of charges in a crime spree situa-
tion; and 3) addition of charges for the same basic criminal acts. Id. slip op. at 38 (Keith, J.,
dissenting). Judge Keith explained that the latter two situations would occasion the mechanical
application of a vindictiveness-in-fact test, and thus, completely forsake the efforts of Pearce and
Blackledge to thwart any chill on the exercise of a defendant's rights. Id. slip op. at 38-39
(Keith, J., dissenting). See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
79. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 32 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith,
J., dissenting).
80. Id. slip op. at 32-36 (Keith, J., dissenting). The balancing test proposed by Judge Keith
would require a court to decide as a threshold matter whether a prosecutor's bringing of a
heavier second indictment appears vindictive. Id. slip op. at 32 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also
Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); note 54 supra. If the appearance of vindictive-
ness was present, the court would then balance in light of all the facts "the extent to which
allowing the second indictment will chill defendant's exercise of the right in question with the
extent to which forbidding the second indictment infringes on the prosecutor's charging author-
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It is suggested that Judge Green's finding that, under the facts of this
case, the court was not compelled to apply Blackledge's rule protecting de-
fendants from the mere apprehension of vindictiveness is supported by prec-
edent and backed by logic. As Judge Green insisted, Bordenkircher's recent
interpretation of Pearce and Blackledge circumscribes the concept of appear-
ance of vindictiveness. 81 Furthermore, the Bordenkircher Court's refusal to
establish a rule against vindictive prosecutorial behavior in the face of a new
indictment admittedly obtained to deter the exercise of a defendant's right to
trial8 2 implicated a balancing rationale not unlike Judge Green's approach in
Andrews. 83 It is therefore submitted that the Sixth Circuit's decision re-
quiring the government merely to rebut a showing of actual vindictiveness,
rather than to refute an allegation of apprehension of vindictiveness, is in
consonance with the Bordenkircher Court's concern for the effective ad-
ministration of criminal justice which demands broad prosecutorial discre-
tion. 84
ity." United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 32 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J.,
dissenting). If the scales tip in favor of the defendant, then appearance of vindictiveness would
be the controlling standard in determining whether the prosecution's action was unconstitu-
tional. Id. slip op. at 33 (Keith, J., dissenting). On the other hand, if the scales tip in favor of
the prosecution, actual vindictiveness would be the relevant standard. Id. In the instant case,
Judge Keith determined that the prosecutor's independent discretion interest was outweighed
by the chilling effect on the defendant's freedom to seek release on bail. Id. slip op. at 35
(Keith, J., dissenting).
81. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra.
82. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 361 & n.7. The prosecutor in Bordenkircher "con-
ceded that the indictment was influenced by his desire to induce a guilty plea." Id. at 361
(citation omitted).
83. Id. at 364. The Supreme Court in Bordenkircher emphasized that although "confronting
a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on
the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an
inevitable'-and permissible-'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates . . . the
negotiation of pleas.' " Id., quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 31. Judge Green's
opinion did not expressly adopt an overall balancing test like that of the Fifth Circuit in Jackson
v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978). United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at
16-17 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). For a discussion of the Jackson v. Walker's balancing approach,
see note 54 supra. However, the basic premise for his requiring a defendant to show actual
vindictiveness in the bringing of added charges was a threshold determination that prosecutorial
discretion in this situation deserves greater leeway than when charges are substituted. Id. slip
op. at 17 n.13. See note 71 supra. See generally note 54 supra.
84. See 434 U.S. at 361-62, 365. This analysis is inconsistent with the view that Borden-
kircher's holding limits its application to the particular facts of that case. See United States v.
Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 37-38 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting). Clearly,
Bordenkircher did hold that under the circumstances of that case there was no due process
violation since the give-and-take of plea negotiation lacks any element of punishment. See notes
40-48 and accompanying text supra. Any view which would so narrowly interpret Borden-
kircher, however, is fraught with difficulty; not only does it discount the Court's treatment of
the competing interests of defendants and of the state in the sensitive area of executive pros-
ecutorial power, but it also interprets vindictiveness issues as admitting to sterile categoriza-
tion. See note 28 supra. In addition, three members of the Bordenkircher minority argued that
the Court's opinion, "although purporting to rule narrowly (that is, on 'the course of conduct
engaged in by the prosecutor in this case,'. . .) is departing from, or at least restricting, the
principles established in North Carolina v. Pearce." 434 U.S. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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It is further suggested that Judge Green's decision to limit Blackledge
by applying only its actual vindictiveness standard in the situation of added
charges is supported by logic. 85 It is contended that Judge Green reason-
ably concluded that if Blackledge's prophylactic rule were applied in cases
involving added charges, the prosecutor's prerogative to initiate prosecution
for different criminal activities would be seriously undermined. 86 Although
a superseding indictment which contains added charges might appear vindic-
tive, it is submitted that "a prosecutor should have greater latitude to aug-
ment charges when dealing with multiple criminal acts." 8 7 It is suggested
that various characteristics of modern prosecutors' offices indicate that such
an increase in the number of charges after the first indictment may often be
reasonably attributable to sheer inadvertence or mistake. 88 If Blackledge's
prophylactic rule were applied in such situations, it would require that the
additional charges be summarily dismissed due to their mere appearance of
vindictiveness, unless the prosecution could show the discovery of previously
85. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). For a
discussion of the court's interpretation of Blackledge, see notes 52-53 & 67 and accompanying
text supra.
86. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of this rationale as set forth
in Hardwick and Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978), see notes 49-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
87. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 33 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith,
J., dissenting). See also id. slip op. at 11.
88. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 2; Noll, supra note 28, at 702. The kinds of cir-
cumstances which may prevent a defendant's initial indictment on charges for which he is
plainly subject to prosecution are: 1) the lack of any central internal review of screening deci-
sions; 2) high staff turnover; or 3) various prosecutors controlling different aspects of the same
case. Id. One commentator has aptly described the background against which modern pros-
ecutorial decisionmaking must be considered:
The modern prosecutor in a predominantly urban environment is no longer the indi-
vidual district attorney who handles all aspects of a case himself. Rather, it is a large
bureaucratic institution comprised of tens or sometimes hundreds of lawyers with an even
larger supporting staff. In such offices, the individual lawyer is more like an assembly line
worker, doing only specific tasks in relation to the product, i.e., the completed prosecu-
tion, than like the old fashioned shoemaker who made the whole shoe ....
...At each [stage], a number of prosecutors may contemporaneously be performing
the same function in different cases. These separate decision-makers may not be in direct
communication with each other, and their decisions may not be subject to a central inter-
nal review.
Abrams, supra, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
It should be noted that the prosecution in Andrews explained that several nonvindictive
factors coalesced to cause the additional conspiracy count to be sought two days after the defend-
ants' bond motion was decided. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 34 (6th
Cir. Dec. 14, 1979), quoting United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. at 1241. The government
argued that except for challenges to the validity of the composition of the grand jury which
caused delays in its work, and except for scheduling difficulties in arranging vacations in the
prosecutor's office, it would have brought the additional conspiracy count prior to the time
defendants were first arraigned and remanded without bail. United States v. Andrews, No.
78-5166, slip op. at 34 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The government also pointed out that its
Assistant United States Attorney in this case was inexperienced and was not aware "that she
should or could have sought a conspiracy indictment." Id. slip op. at 3. See note 10 supra.
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unavailable evidence. 89 It is suggested that such a limitation on prosecuto-
rial discretion would be a high price for society to pay if an accused, whose
guilt was clear, could escape punishment merely because "fragmented"
prosecutorial procedure caused him to be initially indicted for less than all
the violations his criminal spree would permit. a°
Conversely, it is submitted that Judge Green appropriately decided to
apply Blackledge's apparent vindictiveness standard to situations involving
the substitution of charges. 91 Although broad prosecutorial discretion is es-
sential to the functioning of the criminal justice system, 92 this policy must
be reconciled with the due process limitation first established in North
Carolina v. Pearce-namely, that defendants be free of any apprehension of
retaliatory motivation on the part of the government. 93  It is suggested that
89. For a discussion of those circumstances which will dispel the appearance of retaliatory
vindictiveness, see note 34 supra. For a discussion of those explanations which will offset defend-
ant's proof of actual vindictiveness, see note 54 supra. The burden of dispelling apparent
vindictiveness is much heavier than the burden of offsetting actual vindictiveness since the
explanations which will rebut the latter are insufficient to rebut the former. See note 54 supra.
90. By contrast, a number of Ninth Circuit decisions have applied Blackledge's prophylactic
rule regardless of whether the superseding indictment contained additional charges for different
and distinct criminal activities. See United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ruesga-
Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976). Although the broad ambit of prosecutorial
discretion arguably protects society's interest in punishing criminals, the Ninth Circuit felt that
a situation involving added charges was squarely within Blackledge. See cases cited supra. See
also note 54 supra. The operative fact in Blackledge, and the one which the Ninth Circuit
considered crucial in applying its rule protecting defendants from the appearance of vindictive-
ness, was that "the prosecution [had] knowledge of ... facts essential to the more serious
charge at the time of the original indictment." Smaltz, Due Process Limitations on Prosecutorial
Discretion in Recharging Defendants: Pearce to Blackledge to Bordenkircher, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 347, 353, 357 (1979). See also United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d at 1226. Therefore,
even though the second indictment may have involved different crimes relating to a completely
separate fact situation, the Ninth Circuit would not disturb Blackledge's rule as long as the facts
upon which the second indictment was brought were known before the first. Id.
If courts refuse to interpret Blackledge narrowly by limiting it to the substitution of more
serious charges, it has been contended that overindicting could result. United States v. An-
drews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 11 n.7 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). In Andrews, Judge Green
stated that
prosecutors [might obtain] initial indictments containing every count the facts could con-
ceivably sustain, for fear that a defendant's assertion of some protected right which the
government would be required to oppose would create a virtually insurmountable obsta-
cle to the obtaining of a superseding indictment adding counts to those initially set forth
in an original indictment of reasonable scope.
Id. But see id. slip op. at 41 n.23 (Keith, J., dissenting). Of course, instead of being subject to
the possible dilemma of overindictment, vindictiveness issues might be eliminated altogether if
a "regime of full enforcement" of all laws was implemented. Noll, supra note 28, at 706. How-
ever, as one commentator has stated, "[sluch a system would be enormously expensive, waste-
ful, cruel, and probably unworkable. There are now so many laws that it is impractical to try to
enforce them all. If prosecutors could not drop or plead most cases, the criminal justice system
would be overwhelmed.'" Id. (footnotes omitted).
91. See notes 12 & 71 supra.
92. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 14-21 and accompanying text supra.
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because this concept is most forceful, 94 and its limitation on prosecutorial
discretion only minor, 9 5 where there are substituted charges in question, it
is appropriate to fashion a rule requiring the government to bear the heavy
burden of offsetting a defendant's reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness
in this context.
Although Judge Green's unwillingness to follow Blackledge's rule pro-
tecting defendants from the mere apprehension of vindictiveness is sup-
ported by precedent and backed by logic, it is suggested that the standard
he set forth defers excessively to the discretionary interest of the prosecutor
in adding new charges. 96 While Judge Green's systemization of vindictive-
ness issues represents a meaningful attempt to articulate guidelines that will
"maintain 'tolerable consistency' in discretionary prosecutorial decision-
making," 97  it is submitted that such consistency should not be attained by a
total sacrifice of Blackledge's basic proscription against abusive prosecutorial
conduct which may chill the exercise of a defendant's rights. 98 In all fact
situations involving the addition of charges, Judge Green would require a
determination of actual vindictiveness to establish a due process violation,
and would thus allow a prosecutor's explanations for the delay, such as inad-
vertence or mistake, to rebut the alleged vindictive intent in bringing the
second indictment. 99 As suggested by the dissent, this mechanical willing-
ness to apply an actual vindictiveness test and to accept "glib prosecutorial
94. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 10-11 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Judge
Green explained that a defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness is strongest where charges
are substituted since
[oInce the judgment is made as to which penal statute is to be invoked the full extent of
prosecutorial discretion has been exercised.
Under [these] circumstances, absent an explanation encompassing factors unknown or
nonexistent at the time the original decision was made it could fairly be assumed that the
sole factor intervening between such decision and the shift to a more punitive position-
the defendant's exercise of a protected right-played a part in the determination ...
The same cannot be said as regards addition of charges.
Id. slip op. at 11. Cf. id. slip op. at 33 (Keith, J., dissenting) (if a prosecutor augments charges,
as in Blackledge, the apprehension of retaliatory motivation is so great that almost no explana-
tion justifies it).
95. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978). See notes 49-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
96. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 39 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979)
(Keith, J., dissenting).
97. Abrams, supra note 28, at 7. The concept of protecting defendants from the mere "ap-
pearance of vindictiveness" is not only elusive, but it is also capable of arising in an endless
variety of circumstances. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 19-23 (6th Cir.
Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring). See also notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
Thus, it is important that "each prosecutor ... have some notion of the criteria that he and his
fellows are applying" to distinguish permissible from impermissible conduct in order to coordi-
nate decisionmaking in the prosecutorial system. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 7. In essence,
Judge Green's approach weighed the government's interest in having freedom to add charges
against a defendant's interest in being free of the apprehension of vindictiveness, and then
firmly fixed any balance struck. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 16-17
(6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). See also note 83 and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the "chilling effect" which may result from prosecutorial misconduct,
see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra. See also note 89 supra.
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explanations for the seeking of heavier charges could make a mockery of
Blackledge."100 Under Judge Green's approach, it is of no importance
whether the subtleties of a specific factual context indicate that a prosecutor,
who had knowledge of all the essential facts at the time of the first indict-
ment, was retaliating by seeking a heavier second indictment. 101 This
approach needlessly relaxes the judiciary's vigilance against governmental
retaliation by preventing a court from reconsidering equities where the
circumstances of a particular case prove exceptional. 102 Therefore, as the
dissent insisted, it is submitted that a balancing test weighing all the
circumstances would present a more appropriate standard to determine
when there is a need to eliminate the appearance of vindictiveness. Not only
is such a test consistent with Supreme Court precedent, 103 but it is also
submitted that the benefits to defendants 10 4 as well as society' 05 militate in
its favor.
In the wake of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Andrews, a defendant
must show actual vindictiveness in order to bar additional counts in a super-
seding indictment on the basis of unconstitutional prosecutorial conduct. 106
Thus, a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness will succeed only if, after de-
fendant shows actual vindictiveness, the prosecution fails to offer either a
plausible explanation for the actions it took or facts which negate any infer-
ence of actual retaliatory motivation. 107 The differences in the opinions of
100. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 32 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith,
J., dissenting).
101. id. slip op. at 39-40 (Keith, J., dissenting).
102. Id. In the case sub judice, the dissent maintained that there were several facts which
militated against applying the more lenient standard of actual vindictiveness. Id. slip op. at
35-36 (Keith, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Keith considered how vigorously the prosecu-
tion opposed the defendant's release on bail. Id. slip op. at 35 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also
id. slip op. at 2 n.2. In addition, he cited the timing of the addition of charges as a factor which
made the prosecutor's conduct so apparently vindictive. Id. slip op. at 40 (Keith, J., dissenting).
103. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text supra.
105. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 32-34 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979)
(Keith, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 79 supra. While Judge Keith felt that the
equities in the instant case warranted imposition of the stricter standard of apparent vindictive-
ness, he conceded that a prosecutor's discretionary interest in bringing added charges ordinarily
outweighs a defendant's due process interest in being free of the apprehension of retaliatory
conduct. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 42 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith,
J., dissenting). Judge Keith stated:
The peculiar facts of this case are unique in that it is a rare instance where the balancing
test results in the barring of additional charges brought before trial. In most such situa-
tions, the prosecutorial interest will be so strong and the appearance of vindictiveness so
slight that the prosecutor would not be barred from bringing additional charges.
Id. Judge Keith also observed that the balancing test in cases of substituted charges would
result in application of the stricter standard of apparent vindictiveness since a due process in-
terest is strong in such a context while the government's independent-discretion interest is
slight. Id. slip op. at 38 n.19 (Keith, J., dissenting). See generally note 53 supra.
106. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra. In accordance with Judge Green's
formulation, the standard which will apply in a given case depends on whether the added
charges are relatively distinct or similar to the conduct underlying tlse original charge. United
States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
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Judges Green and Merritt, however, will doubtless preclude all hope of pre-
dictability and consistency in vindictiveness cases within the Sixth Cir-
cuit. 108 Fortunately, the uncertainty currently surrounding the standard to
be applied in such cases can be dispelled since the Sixth Circuit has granted
the government's motion for rehearing en banc. 109
Until the Supreme Court provides definitive guidance, the circuits will
continue to be divided concerning the proper standard to be applied in the
case of added charges. It is submitted that if a balancing approach similar to
that advanced by Judge Keith 10 is adopted by the Sixth Circuit, it could
have a significant effect in influencing other circuits to establish reasonable
limits for the concept of apparent vindictiveness. It is further submitted that
the decision in Andrews has already set such a precedent for, notwithstand-
ing the differences of the views in that case, each judge determined that the
effective administration of criminal justice demands that prosecutors have
ample latitude to control the decision to prosecute. 111
Peter R. Kahana
108. See note 55 supra.
109. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979), rehearing granted en
banc, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 1980).
110. See note 80 and accompanying text supra. See also Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d
1002 (1st Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); note 54 supra.
111. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 11 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979); id. slip
op. at 23 (Merritt, J., concurring); id. slip op. at 32, 43 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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